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Article X, Section 2: From Maximum
Water Development to Instream
Flow Protection
By HARRISON C. DUNNING*
Brian Gray's paper convincingly demonstrates the major role that
social utility considerations have played in the development of California
water rights law. The judiciary has modified definitions of water rights,
as it has altered definitions of other kinds of property rights, to accom-
modate changing circumstances and perceptions of desirable social pol-
icy. This modification has occurred with no constraint from the federal
constitutional provision that provides that just compensation be paid for
the "taking" of private property.'
In water rights law, social utility concerns have been manifested in
part by the imposition of a "reasonableness" requirement. This require-
ment has long been invoked in disputes among riparians and in disputes
among appropriators, but California courts once refused to use the same
requirement to limit riparian rights where the competitors were appro-
priators. Article X, section 22 was intended to plug that gap.
Article X, section 2 purported, however, to do more. It stated
clearly and forcefully a more general public policy on water: "the general
welfare" requires the "beneficial use" of water resources "to the fullest
extent of which they are capable." 3 To accomplish this public welfare
goal, water users in the state were to implement water "conservation." 4
When Article X, section 2 was added to the state constitution in
1928, there were common understandings as to what constituted both
"beneficial use" and "water conservation." As was pointed out in a re-
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. A.B. 1960, Dartmouth College;
LL.B. 1964, Harvard Law School.
1. U.S. CONST. amend V. I should note, however, that there has recently been a serious
federal constitutional attack on taking grounds on certain judicial changes in state water rights
law in Hawaii. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated and re-
manded, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
2. CAL. CONsT. art. X, § 2 was enacted in 1928 as article XIV, § 3. Although the num-
bering was changed in 1976, the wording has remained unchanged since 1928.
3. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
4. Id.
[275]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
cent study of irrigation and democracy in the American West by Profes-
sor Donald Worster, conservation of water meant "putting rivers, and
eventually their entire watersheds, to work in the most efficient way pos-
sible for the purpose of maximizing production and wealth. The first
stage in that intensification of use was to dam and store the natural flow,
until not a single drop escaped control."5 The "work" Professor Worster
mentions was beneficial use, usually by way of irrigation, power produc-
tion, or municipal water supply.
Thus, Article X, section 2 was written not only to generalize an
evolving reasonableness standard, but also to give constitutional dimen-
sion to the prodevelopment water policy of the day. That policy of pro-
moting water conservation, as then understood, by preventing the "waste
to the sea" of fresh water, was inspired by some of the great municipal
water development projects in California in the early 1900s.6 It looked
forward to state involvement in such projects in the near future.7
California's current water policy differs significantly from that laid
down in Article X, section 2. Although, in my opinion, we have yet to
strike a fair balance between the need to divert water and the need to
leave it in place, our state water policy today unquestionably gives sub-
stantial protection to the so-called "instream" values-water for uses
such as fishing, boating, or simply quiet contemplation. We have set
aside certain rivers as "wild and scenic," where most development is pro-
hibited, and in a number of other ways we do protect instream flows.
How could this have happened if Article X, section 2 mandated a public
policy of maximum water development?
Unquestionably, the leading decisions on Article X, section 2 have
often favored water development by making it less expensive. For exam-
ple, after its litigation loss prior to the enactment of Article X, section 2,
Southern California Edison had to pay Herminghaus before it could go
ahead with its upstream storage project.' With the amendment on the
books, however, the Marin Municipal Water District was not required to
5. D. WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 155 (1985).
6. By 1928 the City of Los Angeles had completed its aqueduct from the Owens Valley
to the San Fernando Valley. E. COOPER, AQUEDUCT EMPIRE: A GUIDE TO WATER IN CALI-
FORNIA, ITS TURBULENT HISTORY AND ITS MANAGEMENT TODAY 54 (1968). The City of
San Francisco was similarly bringing water from Hetch Hetchy Valley in the Sierra Nevada to
San Francisco and the Bay Area. Id. at 57. The East Bay Municipal Utility District had been
formed in 1923 to bring water from the Mokelumne River in the Sierras to the East Bay, and
in 1928 the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California was established to bring water
from the lower Colorado River to metropolitan Southern California. Id. at 56.
7. WORSTER, supra note 5, at 236.
8. Hermingbaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 112, 252 P. 607, 620 (1926).
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pay Joslin before proceeding with a comparable project.9 Indeed, the
California Supreme Court in Joslin was so influenced by the strength of
the constitutional provision that it dismissed in summary fashion an ex-
cellent statutory argument on Joslin's behalf."°
A variation on the "wasteful downstream riparian inhibits needed
upstream storage" theme of Herminghaus and Joslin is provided by cases
in which the method of diversion of a water right holder threatens to
preclude additional diversions from the stream. Two decisions from the
California Court of Appeal are illustrative. In Erickson v. Queen Valley
Ranch C1.,1 I the method of diversion was a leaky earthen ditch that car-
ried water used for domestic purposes and irrigation. The ditch lost
water that more junior claimants could have used. The appellate court
required the trial court to go beyond a generalized finding as to the rea-
sonableness of the diversion and use of water. 12
In People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board v. Forni,13
defendant Forni pumped water directly from the Napa River to provide
frost protection for vineyards. The state feared that the river might not
have enough water to meet all the frost protection water demand. In
that case, although the riparians held rights far more senior than
others-rights apparently dating back to the time Hastings subdivided
much of the Napa Valley-the court declared that direct diversion by
those riparians in those circumstances would violate Article X, section
2. 4 "Reasonableness," the court indicated, required the riparians to join
a water distribution program run by the State Water Resources Control
Board, with the prospect that they might have to build storage facilities if
they wanted to use water for frost protection.15 The riparians thus lost
9. Joslin v. Manin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d 889
(1967).
10. Section 1245 of the California Water Code imposes liability upon municipal entities
for damage caused by a municipal water supply project to any "property, business, trade,
profession or occupation." CAL. WATER CODE § 1245 (West 1971). The Joslin court decided
that since Joslin had no protectible property right in the continued transport of suspended
rock, sand, and gravel by the stream to which his land was riparian, there was no statutory
liability for damage to his business when the water district's dam cut off the flow of building
materials. Joslin, 67 Cal. 2d at 146, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 386, 429 P.2d at 898.
11. 22 Cal. App. 3d 578, 99 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1971).
12. Id. at 585-86, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 450-51. See Krieger v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 119
Cal. App. 3d 137, 173 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1981), for an entirely different analysis of a similar
problem.
13. 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 747-48, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 853 (1981).
14. Id. at 751, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
15. Id. at 751-53, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 856-57. Ultimately the Forni case was settled, and
although the riparians must participate in and pay their share for the distribution program,
they have not had to build storage facilities. Apparently enough other users did so to eliminate
the threat of inadequate water supply in the river.
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the practical advantage of their senior position. In effect, their use of
direct diversion was limited by Article X, section 2 and held to be a
beneficial use not reasonable in the circumstances because of its actual or
potential adverse impact on other water claimants. The public policy of
maximizing the development of California's water resources was, as in
Joslin, supported by requiring established water right holders to change
their operation and potentially to make expensive water development
investments.
Alongside these cases, in which beneficial use is for domestic pur-
poses or irrigation, and conservation involves capture and physical con-
trol of free-flowing water, we must now consider the instream flow
situation. Changing conceptions of social utility have led to legislative as
well as judicial changes in definitions. Some of the most important
changes have legislatively altered the definition of "beneficial use." Since
1959, the legislature has added to the California Water Code to define
recreation, fish and wildlife preservation and enhancement, and uses nec-
essary for water quality control as beneficial uses of water.16 Keeping in
mind that the declared policy of Article X, section 2 is to maximize bene-
ficial use through water conservation, we see that the latter term must
now have a second sense-precisely the opposite of the first one! Water
conservation now allows leaving water in rivers, for example to sustain a
fishery, as well as taking it out for a use such as irrigation. 7 It includes
free-flowing rivers as much as developed rivers-indeed, the initial provi-
sion of the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act states that the highest
and most beneficial use of protected stretches of some rivers is to flow
undisturbed to the sea."8 The "waste to the sea" so denigrated at the
time of Herminghaus has now become legislative policy for parts of a
number of our rivers.
If the state constitution requires maximum water development and
if legislative protection of instream uses precludes certain water projects,
it of course might be argued that the statutes must yield to the constitu-
tion. Significantly, that argument is rarely heard, even from those who
represent water development interests. 19 In practice, the idea from 1928
16. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1243, 1243.5 (West 1971 and Supp. 1989).
17. WORSTER, supra note 5, at .154, points out that this sense of "conservation" seems to
be closer to the word's origin. Compare the statutory definition of water conservation in one
context as "the use of less water to accomplish the same purpose." CAL. WATER CODE,
§ 101 1(a) (West Supp. 1989).
18. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5093.50 (West 1984). The section also states that flowing
free "is a reasonable and beneficial use within the meaning of Section 2 of Article X of the
California Constitution." Id.
19. In 1977, however, that point was made by the late Donald Stark, a noted water law-
yer, to the Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law.
that there is a state constitutional mandate for water development has
gradually vanished. Although one can never be certain when a theory
may surface in our judicial system, it would amaze me to find a Califor-
nia court today questioning the constitutionality of the state's multiple
instream preservation efforts when they impinge on water development. 20
Notably, no constitutional objection of this sort has been raised regarding
the major limitations on water projects imposed to achieve water quality
objectives in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. Indeed, in the litigation
that did take place over those limitations, the court of appeal noted that
Article X, section 2 authorizes the modification of permit terms, 21 some-
thing that would most likely be done to protect instream values.
Thus, an element of Article X, section 2, deemed highly important
in 1928, has passed from the scene without even a good fight. I suggest
this has occurred because it is so obvious to all the relevant players that
interpretations of constitutional provisions, like definitions of property
rights, are developed with a concern for social utility, and the exclusive
emphasis on water development found in Article X, section 2 has no
social utility for the late twentieth century. Our only Article X, section 2
concern today should be with "reasonableness," elusive as that concept
may remain.
20. One such important, albeit long-neglected, effort is reflected in provisions which re-
quire the owner of a dam to allow "sufficient water at all times... to pass over, around or
through the dam to keep in good condition any fish that may be planted or exist below the
dam." CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937 (West 1984). Recently the court of appeal held that
the State Water Resources Control Board must attach to certain licenses held by the City of
Los Angeles conditions which incorporate the Fish & Game Code requirements. The court
noted its decision "will require reduced diversions from the Mono Lake tributary creeks ......
California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 632, 255
Cal. Rptr. 184, 213 (1989), rev. denied, 1989 Cal.. App. Lexis 63. Los Angeles advanced sev-
eral arguments to support the position that it is not subject to the statutory fish protection
requirements, including an argument that to construe the legislation to require the preserva-
tion of minimum instream flows for fish would be a violation of Article X, section 2. Id. at
622, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 206. Significantly, the city did not argue that minimum instream flows
would violate a constitutional policy of maximum water development. Instead, its position-
rejected after a detailed analysis by the court-was that a priority for one type of use of water
is unreasonable, "because reasonableness of use requires comparison of contending alternative
uses which is an adjudicative question that cannot be constrained by a statutory rule." Id.
21. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 129, 227
Cal. Rptr. 161, 187 (1986).
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